

Executive Registry

65-2859

21 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Request by Ben H. Bagdikian


1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Ben H. Bagdikian, a contributing writer for the SATURDAY EVENING POST, telephoned me to renew a request he had made several weeks ago to Mr. Chrétien for an interview with you. This, he explained, is for an article he has been asked to write for the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE.
3. I told him that you were very busy and I did not know whether you could see him. He said that the editors of the paper had been in contact with him again about this. They had informed him, he added, that if he was unable to see you personally they planned to put together an article on you from their background files.
4. Mr. Bagdikian has also requested an interview with Mr. Helms to discuss "the position of the Central Intelligence Agency in history, now that it has become a well-established organization."
5. Attached is an article written by Mr. Bagdikian for the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE in 1963 which you may find of interest.

STAT

Assistant to the Director

Attachment

cc: ✓DDCI (attention is invited to para 4)
Ex.Dir.-Compt.



HUSH-HUSH HEADQUARTERS—The C.I.A. used to operate out of offices kept so secret that former President Eisenhower once got

lost trying to find them. Now, under businessman John McCone (left), it is quartered in this new \$50-million building in Langley, Va.

Unsecretive Report On the C. I. A.

By BEN H. BAGDIKIAN

BEN H. BAGDIKIAN is a veteran Washington reporter now with The Saturday Evening Post.

WASHINGTON.

A LAPEL button being sold in Washington drug stores these days reads, "My work is so secret I don't know what I'm doing." This has been used as an accusation by some members of Congress and others who want to turn a permanent floodlight on the most glamorous citadel of secrecy in the capital, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Though the C.I.A. has been under increasing criticism for more than three years, the present Congressional agitation is considered the most serious. Some critics would like to keep the agency under constant Congressional surveillance. Others want to dismember it, to separate its three functions—collecting information, evaluating it and carrying out secret operations.

The immediate provocation is the furor in South Vietnam, where at times the President of the United States and the C.I.A. seem to be at cross-purposes. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, under the impression, which is correct, that C.I.A. men in foreign countries are supposed to do what the Ambassador tells them, almost openly challenged the C.I.A. chief in that area. The Saigon episode is the culmination of a series of C.I.A. crises in recent times, most notably the crash of the U-2 plane in Russia just before the summit conference of 1960 and the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. There have been resolutions to put a rein on the agency in the last 10 sessions of Congress, but this year the possibilities of success are greater than ever before.

The C.I.A. finds itself under fire at an uneasy time in its history as a secret agency. Its existence has always been known, of course, from the time it was created by Congress in 1947, and since 1950, when it assumed its present form, its three chiefs—Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and John McCone—have all been public figures. But only recently has the C.I.A. taken on the aura of a conventional Government bureau. It used to live in drab anonymity in barrackslike buildings scattered around Washington's Foggy Bottom, behind the cover, "Government Printing Office." Its headquarters were so unpretentious that President Eisenhower and his chauffeur once got lost trying to find it and had to stop and telephone Allen Dulles for instructions.

G RADUALLY, the C.I.A. has risen to high visibility. Today it occupies one of the most imposing new buildings in the Washington area. Its once awesome initials have entered the language of satire: Cuban refugees in Miami say they stand for "Cuban Invasion Authority," and in 1960 the Soviet Information Bureau used the initials for a book on the C.I.A. called, "Caught in the Act."

Public knowledge about the C.I.A. is a blend of rumor, third-hand infor-

mation and a few hard facts, which the agency officially never confirms or denies. It has been accused of harboring geniuses, of which it has more than its share, and also an assortment of nuts, dolts and screwballs, and these also are not unknown. The late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy said it was packed with Communists, and liberals have said it is riddled with rightists.

One reason for the wild speculation is lack of certain knowledge. Its basic statistics are not announced. Its budget is not printed where the public can see it, going through Congress in fragments hidden in appropriations for other Government activities. The number and kind of its employees is an official secret. A few of its grievous failures have been fairly well documented, its successes usually unannounced. There are true heroes and undoubtedly some villains, but you can't tell the players without a scorecard and no scorecard has ever been printed.

Representative John V. Lindsay, of New York, one of the Congressmen proposing a legislative watchdog committee over C.I.A., said in a speech recently that the agency failed to predict the entry of Red China into the Korean War; that in 1956 a C.I.A. agent told President Nasser to ignore a State Department message the Egyptian leader was about to receive; that the C.I.A. was deeply involved in the East Berlin, Poznan and Hungarian rebellions in the 1950's; that it was instrumental in overthrowing the Mosaddegh regime in Iran in 1953 and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

The C.I.A. has come under fire for fostering the illusion that there was a 3-to-1 missile gap between the United States and Russia in the nineteen-fifties when in fact there was not. Rafael Trujillo's former chief of secret police said the Dominican dictator was assassinated in 1961 with C.I.A. weapons and planning. And French newspapers

said C.I.A. was behind the revolt of French Army officers against Charles de Gaulle.

ON the other hand, the C.I.A. is credited with predicting the launching of Sputnik, the anti-Nixon riots in South America, the rise of Khrushchev to Soviet power, and the Anglo-French invasion of Suez. Harry Howe Ransom, of Harvard University, the leading academic student of C.I.A., says such events are "the top of the iceberg of a vast secret intelligence program."

According to Professor Ransom, the United States spends \$2 billion a year on intelligence operations, of which C.I.A. spends "over half a billion." It is the only agency of Government whose books are not open to the General Accounting Office or even to Congress. It has about 10,000 employees in Washington and maybe as many more elsewhere. In the past it has drawn heavily on Ivy League circles for leadership but today it employs a wide variety of bright young lawyers, both Ivy and non-Ivy, and acute businessmen, plus some middleaged foreigners who know how to parachute from airplanes.

If the American public knows little about the C.I.A., foreign intelligence agencies honor it with unrelenting scrutiny. During the Korean war an important but officially anonymous C.I.A. executive, whom we will call Scattergood, was walking by the door of the Czech Mission in Washington when the doorman bowed and said gravely, "Good morning, Dr. Scattergood."

It is a truism that 80 per cent of intelligence is pure analysis of conventional documents to provide the basic picture illuminated by shafts of less orthodox light sent in by secret agents. Most of its work is a boring battle of routine words and numbers, but upon it depends the reliability of the world-wide intelligence report the C.I.A. hands the President every morning and its estimates of national power and intentions at critical moments.

THE present controversy, though, is not concerned so much with either the secret agents or the war specialists reading foreign budget reports. It is over the more or less secret C.I.A. men abroad

who work out of American embassies. At the middle ranks of American diplomats, the political-officer level, about half the men in an embassy may be C.I.A. employees. If there are guerrilla or other paramilitary operations, several hundred of the experts may be from C.I.A.

Career diplomats have a common complaint about C.I.A. reporters abroad. They are, say Foreign Service men, not sufficiently sophisticated but they have money to spend and so have incomparably more freedom and power than regular diplomats. The C.I.A. traditionally pays for information, though not necessarily in cash but through personal friendships that make cars and apartments easy to find, thereby cultivating a sense of obligation and sympathy. The C.I.A. rates its information on a scale from "1" for absolutely reliable to "6" for unreliable and thinks this scale quite stringent (legend has it that a report of Allen Dulles was once rated "2").

But career diplomats think free information is usually a lot better, and that the masses of data collected by free-wheeling C.I.A. men fall mostly in the 2-3-4 categories while the limited cables and professional perceptions of Foreign Service officers are sounder.

DOES the C.I.A. make policy? Allen Dulles in his new book, "The Craft of Intelligence," calls this the most harmful myth about C.I.A. Yet much may hinge on what is meant by "policy." The C.I.A. certainly does not set national goals or make foreign policy. But such goals and policy are usually general and their implementation is left unspecified, permitting vast discretion as to how best to achieve national goals. The head of C.I.A. sits in the small and crucial Executive Committee of the National Security Council; the President has many advisers but few get as respectful attention as he.

IN the field C.I.A. men are nominally, but not necessarily in practice, under orders of the U.S. Ambassador. They may decide which unions to back, which opposition parties to subsidize, which newspapers to strengthen. In one

case, a high State Department official wanted a few thousand dollars to back an important union in danger of being taken over by Marxists, but the source of money, the C.I.A., demurred. Thus C.I.A. it had to show extreme delicacy in making contact with opposition groups. And it confronted the post-war diplomatic revolution during one of the saddest periods in its history.

Supporters of C.I.A. think it unfair to accuse the agency of usurping State Department functions. They feel, rather, that it is more accurate to say it has expanded into areas unfilled by any other American agency. The post-war years brought a rude awakening to the United States. The world was filled with deadly serious intrigue and manipulation in which foreign societies were no longer stable. Dynamic change was the by-word and many of these societies were on the verge of becoming part of a global system hostile to the United States. Intervention, always a nasty word in American diplomatic history, even when it was practiced, became a major technique of international relations.

The State Department entered this unpleasant new

world at a serious disadvantage. Its tradition, more than that of most powerful foreign offices, was genuinely in favor of open and correct foreign relations. As the official delegation to regimes in power, C.I.A. it had to show extreme delicacy in making contact with opposition groups. And it confronted the post-war diplomatic revolution during one of the saddest periods in its history.

At precisely this time the State Department was reeling under a series of shattering blows. Under President Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, it was attacked by Republicans and other critics, and Acheson was held up as an example of a striped-pants, pussy-footing, cookie-pushing diplomat aflutter before the cynical toughs of Communism. This was, particularly for Acheson, ridiculous criticism. But charges became political issues with a national cry to "clean out" the State Department.

AFTER Eisenhower's victory, Acheson was succeeded by John Foster Dulles. He made no secret of his dislike of most of the State Department career apparatus. This was

the era of "massive retaliation." There was a feeling that with the Strategic Air Command a State Department was unnecessary. The crowning catastrophe was the emergence of Wisconsin's Senator McCarthy whose attacks on the department sent its prestige in Congress plummeting, demoralized its workers and damaged its influence abroad.

It was during this period that the C.I.A. was born and hired its first 10,000 employees. The shift of power and function was eased by the fact that after 1953 Allen Dulles served as head of C.I.A., while his older brother led the State Department. In general, they agreed to the new division of labor.

As guerrilla warfare broke out in a number of areas, the C.I.A. enlarged its military function. This was a novel and unwelcome activity as far as the American military was concerned, particularly since the Army was already being reduced to a shadow by budget cuts and the dominance of the Air Force and Navy, which had little interest in petty fights on the ground. By the time of the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A. was in the paramilitary business on a fairly large scale, but this fiasco cost the C.I.A. some of its men and functions. They were turned over to the Department of Defense. There is now emerging, some observers think, significant tension between Defense and C.I.A., especially with the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which may be the beginning of one of those intelligence rivalries to which the trade is prone.

THE C.I.A. has its own problems, now that it is under fire. In the time scale of the bureaucratic lifespan, it is approaching middle-aged respectability. The most dramatic sign is the agency's new "Spy Palace," a sparkling \$50,000,000, seven-story, million-square-foot edifice of contemporary design in Langley, Va.

Even his friends think that the building is one of Allen Dulles' few serious errors and refer to it sadly as "Allen's Folly." They feel it makes surveillance by enemy agents easier. It is also a revelation of the C.I.A.'s size and power.



"SUPERSPIES"—Under its last two chiefs, General Walter Bedell Smith (left) and Allen W. Dulles, the C.I.A. attained great power.



CRITIC—Disturbed by C.I.A. activities in Vietnam, Ambassador

Henry Cabot Lodge challenged the agency's authority there. that will raise the covetous into a new era. Dulles grew hackles of other agencies — up in the middle of its history, the State Department and Defense Department look drab by comparison — and it makes a dazzling target for Congress. Worst of all, it is feared that C.I.A. employees will be encouraged to feel pride in conventional bureaucratic status rather than in an aristocracy of silence, unorthodoxy and anonymity.

The emergence of the C.I.A. as a visible political fixture goes on in small ways and large. A few years ago it was not even listed in the Washington telephone book but now it is, along with the address of its employment office in downtown Washington. (This office, incidentally, is left scrupulously unmarked). The C.I.A. recruits college graduates (starting salary usually around \$5,000) competing with the Peace Corps and General Dynamics. A year ago C.I.A. Chief McCone asked Congress to provide better pensions for spies. And the agency has participated in two of Washington's most authoritative rituals of bureaucracy: it has been picketed (by pacifists) and it has been beaten in a zoning fight (by, among others, Mrs. Kennedy's stepfather).

THE retirement of Allen Dulles and the appointment of John McCone symbolized for many the passage of C.I.A.

There is an irreparable flaw in any defense C.I.A. makes for itself: It is, in the best of circumstances, contrary to conventional American democratic philosophy. The American ethic calls for self-determination by people abroad, and it calls for an enlightened electorate at home. It is against secrecy in government, its own and others.

Needless to say, this ethic has always been a goal rather than a perfect achievement, but it puts secrecy and interference on the defensive. The C.I.A., more than any other single agency, represents the dilemma modern America faces in a world where it proclaims the Democratic ethic but where the consequences of nuclear miscalculation and surprise are intolerable.

It is into this scene of confusion and anxiety that Congress is now moving, to exercise its instinct to watch

and control the spending of money. A joint committee of both chambers has been proposed, to act as a select set of supervisors in the manner of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Nothing remotely like the surveillance of atomic-energy matters now exists for intelligence operations. Secret operations of C.I.A. are under the jurisdiction of a special committee of the National Security Council, but this is a highly secure Presidential unit, hardly a public overseer. There is also a Presidential appointed board of consultants, consisting of distinguished citizens, but in its first six years it has had a staff of only one plus a secretary, and its members have been both deferential and incurious.

SUBCOMMITTEES of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees have nominal jurisdiction over C.I.A. but they, too, have acted gingerly. The attitude was epitomized by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, of Massachusetts, a member of two of the subcommittees, who said, after the U-2 affair, that he hesitated to probe too far because "we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have."

The House C.I.A. subcommittee meets about five times a year and each session lasts less than three hours. The Senate subcommittee has had about the same schedule for



the last ten years. It is not likely that there is a thorough review in 15 hours a year of an agency that spends more than \$500,000,000 in over 70 countries.

But intelligence executives are appalled at the idea

of Congressional surveillance. The heaviest spectre that hangs over them is that of the late Senator McCarthy. But their fear is even deeper. No intelligence network in the world operates in public. In its operations, lives are at stake, policies are in balance and crucial relations with both friendly and hostile nations depend on discretion. The agency must move quickly in crisis, and report to the President in utter candor no matter how unpopular its message.

"I wouldn't mind a man like Mike Mansfield," one experienced C.I.A. man said, "but when I think of a wrecker or a blabber it turns my blood cold."

Intelligence operatives re-



member "Tawny Pipit," code name for a C.I.A. operation which McCarthy and his ally, Senator Pat McCarran, both ruthless witch hunters, helped to break up. John Paton Davies, in 1949 a leading State Department expert on the Far East, devised the plan. It would have created an American study group on China made up of distinguished scholars, including some pro-Communists (as well as an unannounced C.I.A. man). The group would inevitably make contact with Red China; the pro-Communists would become the Red Chinese-Russian contacts inside the study group. Then the C.I.A. would introduce phony intelligence about Russia to help sow dissension between the two Communist allies.

MCCARTHY, to publicize his attacks on Davies, used this as "evidence" of Davies' "pro-

Communist" sympathies. When General Smith of the C.I.A. told McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee the truth, it was too late to save either Davies or "Tawny Pit."

One alternative to Congressional surveillance is more explicit responsibility by the President and the Secretary of State. But this, too, presents a problem. The C.I.A. is a "dirty" operation and the President and the Secretary of State have to stay "clean." Unpleasant things done in a cynical world are rarely admitted by heads of state. And two exceptions, the U-2 affair and the Bay of Pigs, both harmed the position of the President of the United States.

As the glamour of the black arts decreases, the boldness of Congress will grow. Yet the dilemma has no completely satisfactory solution: secret intelligence is defeated by publicity; democracy is defeated by not enough.

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Oct. 27, 1963

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|--------------------|
| Executive Registry |
| 65-455 |

28 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from [redacted]

STAT

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. [redacted] telephoned this afternoon - the first contact with this office in seven weeks. The conversation, monitored by my secretary, went as follows:

[redacted] asked how everything was. FMC said fine. [redacted] said he was acting on behalf of the Overseas Writers. He said they were a pretty closed group - State Department and some foreigners. He said they were interested in knowing whether Mr. McCone might be available to appear before them. He said most of their stuff is for background and it would be a members only affair. He said he had told them that he would get in touch with us to see if there is a chance of Mr. McCone's doing this. FMC told [redacted] that he could tell him right now that his answer would be no. FMC said he had taken up this sort of request with the DCI before.

Paul M. Chrétien
Assistant to the Director
for Public Affairs

cc: ✓DDCI
Exec. Dir-Compt.

65-41

6 January 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director/Support
Director of Security
Assistant to the Director for
Public Affairs**

SUBJECT : Agency Public Relations

*Shel
MSC*

1. It has been my objective for some years to try to give the Agency a better image as a "neighbor." When we first moved into the building I urged having one or two "open houses" and inviting prominent citizens in Fairfax County to come and see the building. I also thought we might have a similar day for the families of Agency employees, but at that time there was so much nervousness about possible publicity that I couldn't sell either of these programs.

2. Now that we have White House blessing for off-the-record discussions with businessmen and other prominent citizens about the Agency and what it does, I consider it most important that we should start a regular series of visits to the building by friends and neighbors in the Washington area with whom we have dealings. For example, during the 100 Universities Program I attended dinners sponsored by the Agency at Howard, Georgetown, Catholic, American, Maryland and Johns Hopkins Universities. In nearly every instance very senior officials of the University attended the dinner, and in the instance of Georgetown both Father Bunn and his successor were present. All of these people would dearly love to come out to the building for lunch, and I plan to invite them. I also feel that we should have a lunch or lunches for the local law enforcement agencies who do so much to help the Agency, and we might lead this off by a lunch for Chief John Layton who has recently taken over the D. C. Metropolitan Force. You may recall that the last time we did anything of this nature was when Mr. Dulles gave a lunch for them following my talk to the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1960. I also believe that we should have the local government officials such as the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and the mayors of the larger municipalities and the principals of the local high schools, as well as other prominent citizens. All of this is directed toward giving them a better impression of CIA

SECRET

and a recognition that we are responsible citizens who wish to participate in community affairs. In regard to the latter, I believe we should encourage our employees to serve on nonpolitical bodies where they can be of help to the community, and would note that I am a Trustee of the Fairfax Hospital Association and [] of ORR is a member of the Fairfax Hospital Commission.

25X1

3. I would like to ask the three of you to constitute, with myself, an informal committee to work on this and to aggressively push it.

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

LBK:drm

Distribution:

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(1) - ER

1 - ExDir

1964